Community Policing: A Taxpayer's Perspective
Robert C. Trojanowicz
Marilyn Steele
Susan Trojanowicz
National Center for Community Policing
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University
MSU is an affirmative-action, equal opportunity institution.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation to the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. The information contained herein represents the views and conclusions of the authors and not necessarily those of the Mott Foundation, its trustees, or officers.
Copyright © 1986
The National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center
In any case, the basic premise underlying the community policing concept remains the same: it is an attempt to bring officers closer to the communities served, to improve the rapport with community residents. What this rapport ultimately fosters is a better two-way exchange of information. Officers help community residents learn skills which may prevent crimes; they receive, in turn, information that can be used both to prevent and solve crimes. The formula is basic: contact-communication-trust-exchange of information.
While the growth in community policing efforts indicates success, the debate concerning the relative merits and drawbacks of the community policing concept has been extensive and intense. Academic researchers have problems with this "commonsense" approach because it poses numerous methodological problems that make such programs difficult to assess fairly. The impossibility of controlling all the variables posed in a dynamic community makes accurate evaluation difficult. Therefore, researchers commonly criticize community policing as a preoccupation with the past, little more than a passing infatuation with a method of deployment whose time has long passed.
Many contemporary police administrators also express difficulty with the community policing concept. Typically, they argue it is not cost effective, it makes the officers targets for political corruption, and, most importantly, it does not mesh with today's high-tech, computerized age. Some also make the mistake of seeing the argument between "foot" patrol and "motor" patrol as an either/or proposition. While the issue of cost will be dealt with later in this report, a strong mandate from city hall, coupled with effective supervision, can control potential problems of political corruption. Experience also shows that foot patrol fits well with computerized information processing and the use of high technology. Indeed, information gathered by foot patrol officers through face-to-face contact with community residents can later be computerized and then disseminated to others within the department. Foot patrol then is not intended to displace motor patrol; instead, foot patrol can augment other efforts in the department to prevent and control crime.
Yet perhaps the main reason that community policing tends to be undervalued stems from the fact that quality-of-life issues are routinely ignored in most assessments of the program's worth. Academic researchers regularly omit qualitative considerations from their studies, since quality of life does not readily lend itself to quantifiable data. Judging programs solely on narrower standards such as whether the cost is totally justified by the resulting reduction in the crime rate fails to assess the programs' contributions to the broader aspects of life in those communities. Police administrators also tend to underestimate the positive impact community policing has on improving the quality of life experienced by community residents.
Central to the qualitative issues is the question of what role community residents themselves--the taxpayers--should play in determining how their communities will be policed. Community residents are increasingly demanding more input into the disbursement of the limited resources available for community services that directly affect their quality of life. The issues are: Do taxpayers have the right to determine what is important to them? Should they be allowed to decide what programs they feel are most effective and beneficial in achieving desired ends? As this report will describe, the taxpayers in the city of Flint voted twice, the last time by a two-to-one margin, in favor of community policing. In essence, Flint residents put their money where their mouths are by approving a special millage to pay for community policing.
Narrow academic studies, replete with scientific computerized jargon, in concert with the traditionally conservative views of police administrators locked into an all-too-often unresponsive bureaucracy, cannot blunt the momentum of a concept that taxpayers see translated daily into a creative and beneficial program that improves the quality of their lives.
This report will compare two sets of interviews gathered in a longitudinal study of a sample of residents in Flint, Michigan, where an ambitious new foot patrol program began in 1979. A sample of Flint residents was first interviewed in 1981, then again four years later in 1985. The research question is: Can the positive enthusiasm generated among taxpayers for a foot patrol program that became very popular in one American community be sustained over a four-year period?
Before examining the findings, this report will first furnish some background
information. Other materials are available that explain the Flint program
in depth; however, this examination will provide basic information on the
Flint environment, the program itself, the role and image of the foot patrol
officers, as well as a brief recap of the main benefits and drawbacks identified
in the Flint experiment. Following the discussion of the research study
itself is an analysis of the future role community policing will likely
play, at least until the turn of the century.
The Flint Environment
Flint is perhaps best known as the birthplace of General Motors, therefore
making the city a prototypical northern industrial, blue-collar town. Though
General Motors moved its central offices to Detroit many years ago, GM
remains the dominant force in the community, the city's only major industry.
GM factories in Flint continue to produce Chevrolet parts and trucks, Buick
automobiles, car bodies by Fisher, sparkplugs and other automotive hardware.
Flint can also be considered the birthplace of the union movement. The
sit-down strike of 1937 that spawned union power and legitimized collective
bargaining occurred in Flint.
By the middle of this century, the continued growth in the auto industry, combined with the attractive wage and benefit packages enjoyed by unionized autoworkers, allowed Flint to experience an era of prosperity that peaked in 1970, when the population hit its census high of 193,317 residents, with unemployment in the single-digit range. Many of the newcomers attracted to the community were displaced black agricultural workers from the South, lured to Flint by the promise of a higher standard of living.
By the seventies, however, twin forces were converged to throw Flint into an economic tailspin. First, despite initial hopes that automation would expand opportunities for industrial employment, laboring men and women found instead that they were displaced from their jobs. Second, additional layoffs occurred when the energy crunch rapidly accelerated the already-growing trend toward foreign cars, casing the domestic car market to slump severely.
By the time the Flint Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program (NFPP) began in 1979, the city's population had dropped almost one quarter to 159,611 residents, with 41.5 percent black and 56.2 percent white.
The foot patrol experiment was therefore conducted in the worst of times.
The chief of police appealed to the C.S. Mott Foundation for a grant to
inaugurate the program.
Community Policing: The Flint
Experiment
In January 1979, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation provided a $2.6-million
grant to establish the experimental Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in
Flint, Michigan. The program initially consisted of 22 foot patrol officers,
assigned to 14 experimental areas that contained approximately 20 percent
of the city's total population. Prior to implementation of this program,
the Flint police force consisted primarily of motor patrols, as well as
crime preventon and undercover operations.
Flint's Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program was unique in many ways. It emerged from an initiative that directly involved Flint citizens in the planning and implementation phases, through citywide neighborhood meetings in 1977 and 1978. This involvement was designed to address three distinct underlying problems: (1) the lack of comprehensive neighborhood organizations and services, (2) the lack of citizen involvement in crime prevention, and (3) the depersonalization of interactions between officers and residents.
Input from community residents resulted in the initial targeting of 22 officers in 14 experimental areas, as a means of achieving seven basic goals:
However, it must be made clear that the program did not ignore the realities of policing. Foot patrol officers performed these community-oriented services in addition to their regular police work. Foot patrol officers were instructed to provide the same full law enforcement services that their motorized counterparts performed, but they were also told to make a conscious effort to focus on social service aspects of the job, bringing community problems to resolution. Since they patrolled and interacted in the same areas day after day, week after week, this unique opportunity to develop a high degree of intimacy with residents was translated into an effective, cooperative relationship.
Results of the Flint experiment have been reported in full elsewhere.(1) Briefly, however, the NFPP reduced the overall crime rate 8.7 percent in the target areas over the three years of the experiment. Perhaps even more dramatic was the 42 percent reduction in calls for service received by the Flint police department during that same period. As citizens began handling minor problems themselves, or as they turned to the foot patrol officer to act as mediator on an informal basis, there was less need for as many formal complaints as in the past. Additional findings will be discussed later, where appropriate, when comparing the results of the 1981 and 1985 resident interviews.
The Foot Patrol Officer--Role
and Image
The neighborhood foot patrol officer is a police officer assigned to
one defined neighborhood beat. The officer's mandate is to take appropriate
action to support the efforts of community residents to protect themselves
and resolve the problems they identify. Ideally, the combined efforts of
the officer and the community working together will prevent crime before
it occurs, through structured, advanced planning. In this regard the foot
patrol officer acts as a community catalyst to organize Neighborhood Watch
programs, vacationing neighbor watches, nightly porch lighting, programs
to train citizens in self-defense, etc. The foot patrol officer's role
is to act as an organizer and teacher of self-protective actions.
In addition, the foot officer serves as the "chief of police" of the neighborhood beat. The officer is alone, independent, and in continuous contact and interaction with the same group of residents. Whether properly or not, beat residents view the officer as their expert in law enforcement, as their protector and defender. Several officers have described tense situations where residents risked their own personal safety to aid a lone foot officer trapped in a threatening situation. The role of "beat chief" seems especially pleasing to foot officers. Studies show they expressed higher satisfaction with their jobs and greater feelings of personal safety than their motorized counterparts.
The foot officer also acts as neighborhood problem-solver. The officer's day includes responding to telephone calls, knocking on the doors of community residences, and paying friendly calls on local business owners, both informing them of the role and receiving valuable information as well. This aspect of the job makes the foot officer a unique presence in the community.
Many of the daily functions are not directly related to crime. The role also includes providing expert counsel so that citizens can solve their own problems. Many times this involves helping organize the united actions of many residents. Foot officers also reported that one of the greatest personal satisfactions in the job comes from this chance to work on a problem from the beginning to its solution.
Foot officers also act as the local residents' ombudsman or advocate when dealing with City Hall, serving as a bridge between the mayor's staff and the community. Research supports the contention that a citizen's perceptions about the quality of life in the community relate most strongly to signs of "disorder" more than to an actual threat of crime.(2) Irritants such as barking dogs, noisy cars, industrial pollutants, potholes in the street, all are the kinds of annoyances that can make citizens feel their community is deteriorating and that serious crime will soon follow. The foot officer's daily interactions with citizens and the daily observance of the community allows the foot officer to file complaints promptly to the proper officials at City Hall who can rectify problems. The foot officer therefore becomes a special kind of local hero, when "miracles" are performed such as making the city sanitation department pick up noxious garbage. That same officer can also become the neighborhood's chief advocate if the City Hall staff ignores community complaints.
Neighborhood foot patrol officers also become referral agents for other institutions, such as schools, parks and recreation facilities, health-care agencies, and special programs for the elderly. If the role of counselor and referral agency sounds suspiciously like the job of a social worker more than that of police officer, it should be noted that other police officers often argued that social workers, not police, should be ol officers routinely identify and report the location of abandoned houses, deteriorating structures, unrepaired streets, dangerous intersections, and unkempt parks and recreation areas. With proper follow-up from city administrators, requisite city services can be promptly directed to maintain community amenities.
Often the first sign of neighborhood disorder and impending decay is an abandoned automobile on the street or in a yard. Foot patrol officers regularly tag cars for tow-away, unless the owner removes the vehicle within the required time period. Foot officers also help maintain enforcement of the city building codes. When residential or commercial structures fall into dangerous disrepair, the foot patrol officers alert officials who can demand timely repairs or order demolition. Not only do the foot officers identify the problems, but they follow through until they are solved.
3. Improved Racial Relations. The keepers of the peace in America are city employees in uniform who carry guns, in contrast to authoritarian governments which maintain order with soldiers armed with the weapons of war. Insuring that citizens sense that this distinction translates into practical differences in their neighborhoods is critical in maintaining community support for police. As has long been the case in many major metropolitan areas, the Flint police force was a bastion of employment for white males. What this too often meant was that the most typical confrontation was between an older white male officer and a young black male resident from a black neighborhood. These clashes routinely led to mutual antipathy. A disproportionately high number of young black males reported mistreatment by white police, further increasing widespread hostility toward the police in black neighborhoods. Past city civil disturbances inevitably pitted black youths against white police. On the other side of that equation, white police often harbor memories of negative experiences with young gangs, street fights, and taunts and curses, with their resulting feelings of pain and fear, that occurred in black neighborhoods. Therefore mutual distrust, mutual hostility, and mutual racism in Flint have been very real problems.
The Flint Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program helped ease racial tension by fostering trust on both sides. The initial composition of the foot patrol force itself helped break down stereotypes, since an effort was made to include blacks and women as officers. Several of these officers performed in such outstanding fashion that they earned special recognition from the community for specific efforts in organizing neighborhood block clubs, assisting the elderly with personal security, involving community residents in training programs, and structuring worthwhile activities for young people, in addition to performing regular police duties.
Also, that special interaction and close communication fostered between foot patrol officers and community residents allowed trust to build, regardless of the race of the officer involved. Astonishingly, considering the prevailing racial climate, community residents began assessing their officers's performance independent of race. Indeed, black residents had few reservations about criticizing a black foot patrol officer, while in other beats, white residents would fight to prevent losing a trusted black officer. For many black Flint residents, this program provided them their first positive experience ever with a human being wearing a uniform, carrying a gun, who also carries a badge. Foot officers, too, benefited from positive feedback from community residents, increasing their levels of trust. As noted before, Flint foot patrol officers reported higher levels of satisfaction with their jobs, as compared to their motorized counterparts, as well as greater feelings of safety. In fact, a greater feeling of safety was reported among both officers and residents.(3)
4. Reduction of Juvenile Delinquency. Many neighborhoods in Flint experienced a marked reduction in the number of juvenile misdemeanors following implementation of the foot patrol program. This drop is directly attributable to efforts made by foot patrol officers. Besides his or her role as law enforcer, foot patrol officers also worked hard in identifying culprits and potential culprits, making a special effort to get to know them. Then the officer organized alternative self-affirming experiences for these young people. One creative officer transformed a group of young people who had been vandalizing a local park into protectors of that facility by implementing a reward system. Another inventive officer developed seasonal athletic teams the young people found so appealing that every young resident in her beat area belongs to one of the teams. In yet another area, the officer enlisted the help of a concerned mother in the neighborhood to form a boys and girls club. Juvenile crime is, in fact, virtually nonexistent in beats where officers have maintained alternative youth programs, typically in cooperation with other community agencies.
5. Crime-Related Information. Foot patrol officers can reduce the department's dependence on undercover police as the primary source of information on illicit activities, especially concerning drug houses and prostitution. Because foot patrol officers maintain intense, regular, face-to-face contact with community residents, they can identify individuals and residences involved in illicit activity, reviewing crime information and comments from concerned citizens, within the context of a confidential relationship. They can then increase the communication flow within the department, by exchanging this information with other officers.
6. Service to Vulnerable Populations. Like many other northern, industrial cities, Flint's core has a concentration of residents locked into a cycle of poverty with little access to the limited resources that offer any hope for improvement. Many black youths age 16 to 24 are unemployed, including those with as well as those without a high-school diploma. Many have never had even one job, because employment opportunities are limited, even for adults. Alienated young people with little to structure their time tend to congregate in groups that terrorize each other, as well as other fragile populations, like younger children and the elderly.
Watchful officers can spot adult loiterers or unfamiliar cars parked near schools. Foot patrol officers have also been instrumental in setting up special security training programs for children. They also provide daily surveillance at schools, as part of the continuing effort to increase the safety of Flint children.
Flint also has many elderly widows who live alone in houses they have lived in their entire adult lives. Neighborhood foot patrol officers contact them regularly to assure their well-being. Many elderly residents report they see their foot patrol officers more often than they see their own children.
Unemployed youth, small children, and the elderly are fragile, vulnerable populations that depend increasingly upon cities for their survival. For them, the presence of uniformed, armed police is a reminder of personal security. And for the offender intent upon harming these populations, the officer is a visible symbol of legal authority, as well as an armed deterrent.
Our constitution offers the promise of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program enhances the opportunity that city residents can help fulfill that promise, especially for the many dependent constituents who have few resources of their own. The program contributes substantially to a sense of community, creating an atmosphere of trust between police and citizens that offers a unique means of improving the quality of life for all taxpayers.
Negative Aspects of Foot Patrol.
While studies of the Flint Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program have affirmed
many positive aspects, several important problem areas were also targeted.
1. Cost. In both lean and flush times, the city of Flint was unable to cover the complete cost of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program within the limits of its operating budget. The C.S. Mott Foundation paid for a substantial portion of the original experiment, with residents later voting to increase their taxes through a special millage to continue to fund the program. Certainly, it is cheaper to pay for one officer on foot than for two officers in an automobile, especially when you factor in the cost of purchasing, equipping, and maintaining the vehicle. However, an officer in a patrol car can cover four times the area of one foot officer, with greater promptness.
Therefore, it is obviously quite difficult to develop a formula that equitably compares the costs of these two very different kinds of patrols. Simplistic cost analyses risk being unfair. Equating dollars spent solely in terms of area covered and response time obviously favors motor patrol. The difficulty arises in putting dollar amounts on the more intangible benefits foot patrol provides. For instance, what is it worth to a city to reduce hostility to its police department? What price tag should be placed on maintaining community stability? How do you measure and assess the value of a reduction in vandalism? In short, what criteria can be used to measure the overall improvement in a community's quality of life? And how do you measure those cost implications?
Perhaps it is the willingness of Flint citizens to pay increased taxes to maintain the program that is the best measure of the program's worth to the consituency it serves.
2. Response Time. The Flint Police Department frequently receives complaints that its response time on calls for service is too slow. The undeniable fact that foot patrol officers cannot arrive on the scene as quickly as motorized patrols therefore draws criticism. However, estimates show only a small percentage of police calls demand an immediate response. These are emergency calls where immediate response might prevent a crime from occurring. The majority of calls actually take place after the crime has occurred, not before or during commission of a crime when intervention could make a significant impact on the outcome.
The responsibility for deciding whether the call requires urgent attention rests with the telephone radio dispatcher. This dispatcher also has the responsibility to communicate as accurately as possible to the caller how long it will be before an officer arrives and why. Many post-crime follow-ups, such as those for auto thefts and breaking and entering, can be made by a foot patrol officer the next day.
In any planned police intervention, the foot patrol officer makes an ideal team member, especially in clean-up operations involving prostitution and drug houses. The foot patrol officer's unique familiarity with his or her beat area allows for quick identification of houses, owners, tenants, streets, and buildings. Enlisting the support and cooperation of the foot patrol can actually reduce the workload of other bureaus in the department, making them in turn more efficient.
3. Hostility of Other Officers ("It isn't real police work.") Resistance to change is the inevitable by-product of any social experiment, regardless of setting. Employees, whether laborers or professionals, tend to resist changes that affect their jobs, and police officers are no exception. And adding to this inherent reluctance to embrace change is the fact police officers are traditionally quite conservative, making them even more resistant to change. The very nature of their work heightens that intrinsic tendency toward conservatism. The police officer is confronted daily with a barrage of human crises, focusing almost exclusively on the results of human failure and error, not success. The officer must perform the duties in a climate of stress, dashing from one emergency to another. Complicating his role further is his mandate to enforce the law "as it is," not always as the community thinks the law "should be."
These factors contribute to feelings of hostility toward any new program, but a foot patrol program especially tends to draw fire from motor patrol officers, who disparage the foot officer's job as "easy duty," calling them members of the "grin and wave squad." In Flint, motorized officers tended to express resentment toward what they felt were the special arrangements foot officers had with citizens, complaining the job was community relations or social work, not "regular" police work. Motorized officers characterized themselves as the unsung heroes, running from call to call handling serious problems that placed them in jeopardy, while foot patrol officers spent their days idly chatting with residents, basking in the positive feedback from people they knew on a first-name basis.
Indeed, the greatest potential threat to the success of the Flint foot
patrol operation was and still is the hostility from other officers. Attempts
were made to lessen this friction. What often worked best was rotating
motorized officers into the program, especially those who had burned out
on motor patrol and who benefited as well from having their enthusiasm
for police work rekindled. But this still remains a problem area that demands
constant vigilance.
Longitudinal Comparisons of 1981
and 1985
Given the results just described, Flint residents were reinterviewed
to determine if the positive perceptions of the program could be sustained
over time. The following is a discussion of the comparisons of the 1981
and 1985 data.
In 1981, 280 residents were randomly selected from the 14 experimental foot patrol areas. Individuals in this sample were interviewed, and their responses tabulated and reported in An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan. (4)
In 1985, a decision was made to re-evaluate the perceptions of these same taxpayers to see what changes had taken place in their attitudes during the intervening four years. The research question was: Can interest in and support of foot patrol be sustained over a four-year period?
Attempts were made to contact all 280 residents originally sampled but
only 98 were located. The others had died, moved, or had unlisted phone
numbers. The 98 participated in a telephone interview, then the resulting
data was tabulated and compared with the information generated in 1981.
Discussion of Tables
Tables Showing Little or No
Difference.
Table 1 provides identifying data relating to gender, age, race, number
of years at the residence, and the type of respondent (resident, businessperson,
minister, or neighborhood association leader).
Tables 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 15 show relatively little change (5 percent or less) between responses made by residents in 1981 versus 1985 concerning their perceptions of foot patrols. For example, Table 2 shows that roughly the same percentage had at least some knowledge of what foot patrol officers are required to do. While 5 percent fewer in 1985 flatly said "Yes" that they know what foot patrol officers are required to do (39 percent versus 44 percent in 1981), the number who said "No" also declined slightly as well, from 49 percent to 48 percent over the four-year period. Most of these changes were reflected in the increase in the category of those who said they knew at least some but not all of what foot officers did.
In 1981, more respondents also said they had seen or talked with an officer, and more could provide a description or name (see Tables 4 and 6) compared to 1985. This relatively small decline in apparent visibility over the four years could, however, be the direct result of changes made in the program. Foot patrols started in 1979 with 22 officers distributed among 14 beats, with some beats assigned two officers. Six years later, the number of beats was increased to 64, covering the entire city, with no more than one officer per beat. At the same time, the geographic area of each beat was also expanded.
Studies done in each of the first three years of the program showed a sharp drop-off in perceived visibility of foot officers the third year (1981), because boundaries of the 14 areas had been expanded due to the popularity of the program and "political considerations." And because there is often a time lag between change and the perception of that change, the benchmark set in 1981 could have reflected a level of visibility that continued to decline as evidence of those changes continued to become apparent to community residents. This could explain part, if not all, of the small differences reported between the 1981 and 1985 studies.
Questions that relate to crime, unreported crime, and victimization (Tables 7, 9, and 12) show responses were almost identical both years, with very little variation.
Also, as Table 15 illustrates, the number of respondents who were knowledgeable about the projects the neighborhood foot patrol officer was involved in remained about the same. Unfortunately, both samples show that many area residents did not know about specific programs. In 1981, foot patrol officers were encouraged to take steps to supply this information to the community at large. They were urged to write handouts for school and church newsletters and to talk with community residents about the projects. However, as these tables demonstrate, this remains an area where more work must be done.
Even though 2 percent more of the residents in 1981 reported talking to neighbors about the program, this difference remains inconsequential (see Table 13).
Tables Showing Major Differences.
Tables showing major differences in the responses between 1981 and
1985 will be discussed in order, from the highest degree of difference
to the lowest, with the lowest still reflecting more than a 5 percent change.
The two most dramatic differences related to perceptions of safety. In 1981, 17 percent more of the residents interviewed said they felt safe, compared to 1985 (see Table 18). Also, four years earlier, 17 percent more felt the program increased the safety of women, the elderly, and young people than in 1985 (Table 16). Note again that this may be directly related to the lag effect of changes made in the program, reflecting the increase in beat size.
In addition, 15 percent more said in 1981 that they felt their neighbors had favorable attitudes toward foot patrol officers compared to 1985 (see Table 14). When asked how satisfied they were with foot patrol officers in their neighborhoods, 13 percent more reported a high-satisfaction level in 1981 compared to 1985 (see Table 3). Again, 1981 showed a more favorable response compared to four years later concerning whether foot patrols had lowered the crime rate in their neighborhoods. But while those who said "Yes " dropped 11 percent, from roughly 60 percent to 49 percent, note that those who said "No" only rose 6 percent. The rest of that shift is reflected in the increase among those who said "Don't know" or "No opinion" (see Table 10).
When asked how protection for women, children, and the aged could be improved, 10 percent more provided specific suggestions in 1981 compared to 1985 (see Table 17). However, in both years, suggestions made were quite general, such as increasing visibility of foot officers or increasing the number of officers. Again, this could be the result of changes in the program, combined with the fact few residents knew specifics about programs foot officers had developed.
Also, not only did the residents in 1981 perceive foot officers as more active than they did four years later, when asked how often they actually saw officers, the 1981 response was 9 percent higher among those who reported seeing the officer one or more times a week (see Table 5).
When asked whether foot patrol officers encouraged citizens to report crime and become involved in crime prevention programs, 6 percent more said "Yes" in 1981 than in 1985 (see Table 11).
Table 25 shows the only distinct improvement over the four years, with 7 percent more residents saying in 1985 that they know the names of community leaders. This increase is probably attributable to the fact that, over the years, more neighborhood block clubs and associations were developed by foot officers. Part of the increase as well could stem from the cumulative effect of increased news coverage of the foot patrol program.
While only this table demonstrates a major positive change over the four-year period, the seeming decline in awareness of and enthusiasm for foot patrol must be tempered not only in terms of what difference changes might have made, but in terms of rising expectations. Students of human behavior can attest that even dramatic improvements quite rapidly become taken for granted. Then those strides forward simply become the norm against which incremental improvements are judged. In that light, the fact that 1985 re-evaluation demonstrated some decline in straightforward, positive approval ratings was not at all surprising. In addition, in 1981, the Michigan State University research team was involved in the foot patrol evaluation process. This means there was closer monitoring of the program, with constant feedback between the research team, the command staff of the Flint Police Department, and monitors of the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation.
Comparisons Between Foot Patrol
and Motor Patrol.
Six tables (Tables 19-24) examined residents' perceptions of which
kind of patrol was better, foot patrol or motor patrol, in 1981 versus
1985, in terms of: preventing crime, encouraging citizens to protect themselves,
responding to complaints, investigating the circumstances of crime, working
with juveniles, and following up on complaints.
While the percentages changed during the intervening years, in only one case (see Table 22) was there a shift in which force was perceived as better. Table 22 shows that in 1981, more residents gave the nod to foot patrol as being more effective in investigating the circumstances of crime. By 1985, more favored motor patrol. However, it should be noted that foot patrol edged out motor patrol by only 3 percent in 1981, virtually a tie. By 1985, those who chose foot patrol dropped 11 percent, from 38 percent in 1981 to 27 percent in 1985. However, those who chose motor patrol also dropped, by 3 percent, from 35 percent in 1981 to 32 percent in 1985. The largest and most dramatic increase was among those who said they didn't know, rising from 8 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in 1985. Obviously, the close vote in 1981 demonstrates this is a tough question to call, considered even tougher by the time of re-evaluation.
The other tables showed no outright reverses over the four years, with foot officers still perceived as more effective than motor patrol in preventing crime, encouraging citizens in protection, working with juveniles, and following up on complaints. As in 1981, the 1985 findings showed residents felt motor patrol did a better job responding to complaints, no doubt the result of quicker response time facilitated by using squad cars.
Of interest as well is that fact that, over the four years, the approval rating for foot patrol performance overall declined somewhat; however, not all that decline registered as increased approval for motor patrol, and as demonstrated above, approval for motor patrol sometimes declined as well over the four-year period. For example, while 60 percent of residents in 1981 said foot patrol was more effective than motor patrol in preventing crime, this figure dropped to 46 percent by 1985 (Table 19). Yet that 13 percent drop resulted in only an 8 percent gain for those who said motor patrol did a better job, with the other 5 percent split between those who said "Both" or "Do not know."
Again, while Table 20 shows 79 percent of respondents said foot patrol was more effective in encouraging citizens to protect themselves, by 1985 this dropped 17 percent to 62 percent. Yet motor patrol showed only a 3 percent increase, from 7 percent to 10 percent by 1985. Of note as well is the fact that both foot patrol and motor patrol suffered a decline during the four years when citizens were asked which patrol was more effective in responding to complaints. Those who said foot patrol was better declined 5 percent, from 32 percent in 1981 to 27 percent in 1985, while motor patrol showed a 4 percent decline, from 54 percent to 50 percent (Table 21). Again, the increases were in categories such as "Both," "Neither," and most dramatically among those who said "Do not know."
The same result is reflected concerning the question of which patrol does a better job working with juveniles. In 1981, 83 percent said foot patrol officers were better (Table 23). This dropped to 66 percent in 1985. In both 1981 and 1985, few chose motor patrol, with the 7 percent in 1981 dropping even further to 5 percent in 1985. The apparent 17 percent drop in the foot patrol rating over time exactly equals the increase in the "Do not know" category.
Asked which patrol is more effective in following up complaints, foot patrol officers received the nod from 57 percent of respondents in 1981, dropping to 36 percent in 1985 (Table 24). Yet again, motor patrol received only 8 percent of that 21 percent decline, rising from 14 percent to 22 percent over the four years. And while this study did not specifically address this issue, one reasonable explanation for some of the changes reflected in these tables could be that the goodwill generated by foot patrol officers has been extending to motor patrol officers over time. As mentioned earlier, before the foot patrol experiment, the only associations many residents had with the police were negative. The implementation of the foot patrol program allowed more and more residents to have positive experiences with police, and this may be extending into improved attitudes overall about police, including motor patrol.
Tables Discussing Changes,
Expectations, and the Future.
In 1985, three new questions were added to the interviews: Has the
foot patrol program changed since you were interviewed in 1981 (Table 26)?
Do you have different expectations for the program now that it is financed
by tax dollars rather than other funds (Table 27)? Do you feel foot patrol
should be continued, and under what conditions (Table 28)?
Concerning Table 26, about whether the program has changed, 49 of the 98 respondents, precisely half, felt the program had changed for the worse. Complaints included the perception that officers were now riding in cars part of the time, officers were being rotated more, and they were not as visible or available as in the past--"They no longer stop to visit," As discussed before, part of this dissatisfaction could be the result of the expansion in beat areas and the resulting lag in perception of those changes, along with rising expectations. Thirty of the 98 respondents said the program had not changed, while 13 percent said they didn't know. Six of the respondents felt the foot patrol program had improved, citing that officers were now more visible and available, that they were more active in the schools and in youth activities, with one specifically mentioning foot patrol involvement with the Cub Scouts, indicating again that the more aware residents are of specific programs foot patrol officers are involved in, the greater the value they place on the service.
Table 27, concerning whether expectations had changed now that tax dollars were the source for funding, 77 of the 98 respondents said their expectations had not changed. However, 21 said they had different (higher) expectations than before.
When asked whether the program should be continued, and under what conditions, Table 28 shows the overwhelming majority, 87 of 98 respondents, said yes. A total of 22 said the program should be more visible. In addition, five said officers needed to work more closely with residents; four said they should re-evaluate their role; three said they should work more closely with youngsters; three said they should work more evening hours; two said foot officers needed cars; one said there should be changes in the upper command; one said officers needed better training. A total of 11 said the program should not be continued, because it wasn't visible enough, it failed to deliver proper services, lack of availability, and "taxpayers just aren't getting their money's worth."
In general, the commitment to the program was strong, but there was a feeling that there was room for improvement, especially increased visibility of foot officers. Many said they felt the beats were so large that the officers could not effectively interact with residents.
The last table (Table 29) compared the expectations residents had for their foot patrol officers in 1981 with 1985. In 1981, 90 percent had specific expectations, rising to 98 percent in 1985. Comparing the two studies showed that 80 percent had the same general expectations, and in both years, 10 percent said officers should work with young people. A major change is that roughly half the respondents, 48 percent specifically mentioned visibility or availability as an expectation in 1985, while only half that number, 24 percent, said the same thing in 1981.
Also, in 1985, expectations tended to be more specific. For example,
more frequent mention was made of: reducing vandalism, mediating disputes,
quelling disturbances, keeping kids under control, and protecting people
form drug dealers. The 1981 expectations tended to be more vague: be aware
of what's going on, take care of the neighborhood, provide protection,
develop police/community relations, get to know residents, get acquainted,
meet people, friendliness. While Table 27 indicates residents did not feel
they had higher expectations now that tax dollars were funding the program,
Table 29 shows this may not be the case because what is expected now is
far more concrete.
Conclusion: The Future of Community
Policing
The contemporary urban scene provides an environmental base for predicting
the near future, up to 2000 A.D. No doubt the pace of change will quicken.
Daily crises confronting urban dwellers unable to adjust to new conditions
are likely to increase, impinging on the prospects for an orderly life
in the city. The potential for creating enough new jobs to meet the demands
among the growing number of unemployed is clouded. Few Americans appear
ready to discard the work ethic as a primary value, nor do many seem ready
to accept public charity as an inherent right.
Cities in the near future will likely continue the current pattern of becoming concentration centers for poor people--single mothers, unemployed adults, mainstreamed former mental patients, the elderly poor (including both couples and widowed singles), and the growing number of children living in poverty. These are the fragile populations, living on the fringes of the American dream, with few comforts, uncertain of their survival from one welfare, disability, or Social Security check to another. These people often live in homes that are poorly maintained, where leaky roofs, drafty rooms, faulty plumbing, and roaches and rodents are the norm, hemmed in by noise and air pollution and a real or perceived threat of menace on the streets. Most rely on Medicaid or Medicare for their health care, if an appropriate clinic or doctor is nearby. If not, many find transportation prohibitively expensive, if it is available at all.
While most disputes may be relatively easy to resolve in pleasant surroundings, fights, especially family fights, breed in such misery. These are the street people, the underclass, whose quality of life can be improved dramatically by the presence of a familiar police officer on foot in the neighborhood, reinforced by a motor patrol in emergencies.
It is the responsibility of elected officers and city administrators in leadership positions to work toward improving the quality of life for city residents, both rich and poor. Advocacy that calls attention to the signs of neighborhood blight lies within the power of elected representatives, city commissioners, and the mayor. But advocacy alone will not guarantee that civil servants will do their jobs properly and promptly. Their failure to maintain streets and parks, to remove abandoned cars and houses, to enforce building codes, all contribute to neighborhood deterioration. Vigilant maintenance of neighborhood living standards, organized and sustained by neighborhood foot patrol officers, can discourage prostitution and drug houses, while on the other hand, visible neighborhood decay becomes a magnet for crime. (5)
The future of community policing in metropolitan areas is hopeful. Cities where residents are encouraged to contribute both their voluntary efforts and their tax dollars for foot patrols can provide clean, wholesome neighborhoods. Neighborhood foot patrol officers serve both as advocates and enforcers. They can have a dramatic impact where citizens are willing to help maintain their own property and are willing to contribute their voluntary efforts to maintain the community.
However, it is incumbent on civil administrators that they maintain an equal commitment to providing a quick response to citizen complaints. If a neighborhood officer files complaints to an unresponsive city hall, voluntary efforts are ultimately futile. The partnership must be triangular--residents, foot patrol, and city administration. A foot patrol officer can contribute to neighborhood stability only to the degree that city employees follow through with prompt, appropriate action.
It must also be remembered that wealthy people fear crime and criminals, too. And while they may have the resources to hire their own security force and install expensive security devices to protect their lives and property, the wealthy also have the right to expect their taxes will guarantee safe streets and good city services. The benefit of having an armed officer on foot who can serve as a neighborhood diagnostician providing information on security and serving as a community ombudsman with city hall is as welcome in rich neighborhoods as poor ones. Politically, every neighborhood is entitled to effective and efficient city services, and the fact those who are relatively well-to-do also voted in Flint to increase taxes for foot patrol demonstrates that such programs are popular among all social classes.
Community policing has been embraced by residents in large metropolitan areas like Boston and New York City. However, experience suggests that crucial to the program's success is the size of the beat. It must be tailored to the population density, crime rate, juvenile population and residential living patterns. A familiar beat cop is the community's best hope of cleaning up drug houses and prostitution. The good neighbors in every community are willing to provide valuable information to a known and trusted foot patrol officer. Foot patrol officers report they often receive more information, at far less personal risk, than undercover officers. Remember that the same good neighbor justifiably might be reluctant to provide information to a motor patrol officer he or she does not know, especially when that squad car in the driveway signals to offenders who in the neighborhood is being asked to supply information. It is because a beat officer routinely knocks on doors and makes visits that there can be numerous opportunities for confidential information exchange to occur within an atmosphere of mutual trust.
Of obvious concern is the possibility that community policing opens police officers up to political corruption. The days of Tammany Hall, when police felt compelled to become politically active to survive, are not that distant. The reality is that neighborhood officers are in a strategic position to influence neighborhood votes. It takes a strongly reinforced moral imperative to strengthen the police officer's resolve to investigate corruption, rather than to proselytize for votes. What is required is a strong directive from city hall to keep the police out of politics. Police supervisors must carry through the mandate to officers that they must concentrate on their civic responsibility to protect the public, free of political corruption.
If cities in the future are to become livable places for all residents--rich and poor, young and old, singles and families, healthy and ill, black and white--the prospects for expanding community policing are favorable. The "grin and wave squad," the familiar neighborhood police officer, the after-hours sponsor of the youth team, the community advocate, the block club organizer, the community problem solver, the drug-house and prostitution informant, the neighborhood back-up for motor patrol, these are only some of the many roles that community-based foot officers will fill in the future. Their successful performance is a fundamental condition for wholesome environments in the cities of tomorrow.
However, great controversy swirls around the question of whether community policing has merit in today's world. Academic critics point to their studies done on narrow parameters as justification for abandoning the concept, while defenders of such programs argue that methodological problems that prevent these studies from assessing quality-of-life issues hamper such programs from being evaluated accurately. Many traditional police administrators insist that foot patrol is no more than nostalgia for a past that no longer exists, and the foot patrol officer is an obsolete anachronism in today's high-tech world. Proponents argue that intransigence to change prevents many conservative administrators from embracing the program, and that information generated by foot patrol officers improves the quality and quantity of computerized information that can be disseminated to other units in the department.
Critics also say that the foot officer in uniform, although increasing perceptions of safety, does not reduce crime. They are basically correct. Community residents involved in the crime prevention and solving process are the ones who reduce crime. The question then becomes how can the professional expert, i.e., the police officer, facilitate community residents becoming more active as crime preventers and solvers? The foot officer can be the "expert" in diagnosing and analyzing community problems and crime data, and in organizing residents through associations and watches to collectively look out for their own interests. Through public education and encouraging the appropriate use of community agencies, including the police, the foot officer can be the catalyst in improving the quality of life in neighborhoods.
If the current popularity of foot patrol among taxpayers is inappropriate and/or an inefficient use of resources, what are the alternatives? Expand the use of motor patrol? The findings of the Kansas City experiment addressed the use of motor patrol as a deterrent. (6) Should, then, the investigative division, the second largest operational unit in police departments, be expanded? The Rand Study seems to be clear on this issue. (7) Is greater efficiency the answer, i.e., improving response time and 911 systems? The research has also addressed the shortcomings of the efficiency models. (8) Is the greater use of technology, i.e., computers, the key? Computers only process information, they do not provide information --"garbage in, garbage out." Person to person contact is still the only reliable means of tapping peoples' thoughts, ideas, needs, perceptions and facts about incidents.
Community policing critics may also agree that increased motor patrol, more intense investigation services and improved efficiency and technology are not the answers. The question then is, should the delivery of police services continue to be "business as usual"? Improving the quality of life in neighborhoods demands commitment and innovation. Diverse experiments are needed, community policing being only one attempt to deal with the complex problems that exist in dynamic and diverse communities.
Undeniably, however, the citizens in Flint proved they not only want foot patrol, they are willing to pay for it. Twice, in 1982 and again in 1985, Flint citizens voted to increase their property taxes to pay for their foot patrol program. Indeed, the 1985 margin of approval (2 to 1) was even greater than in 1982. Whether community taxpayers should have the right to decide on the process of policing and the form of the deployment of people power will no doubt be debated for years to come. Also, conditions within the community will continue to change, so there will be a strong need for constant evaluation of the appropriateness of community policing in the future.
APPENDIX
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Count Percent Gender Male 35 35.7 Female 63 64.3 Totals 98 100.0
Race Black 32 32.6 White 63 64.3 Unknown 3 3.1 Totals 98 100.0
Age Senior Citizen 24 24.5 Not Senior Citizen 65 66.3 Unknown 9 9.2 Totals 98 100.0
Years in Neighborhood 0-5 16 16.3 6-10 19 19.4 11-15 13 13.3 16-over 50 51.0 Totals 98 100.0 Type of Respondent Neighborhood Resident 79 80.6 Business Leader 9 9.2 Minister 3 3.1 Neighborhood Association Leader 7 7.1 Totals 98 100.0
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (44) (39) 44.9% 39.8% No (49) (48) 50.0% 49.0% Some (5) (11) 5.1% 11.2% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (72) (59) 73.5% 60.2% No (16) (28) 16.3% 28.6% Sometimes (6) (2) 6.1% 2.0% Cannot Say (4) (9) 4.1% 9.2% Totals 98 (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (79) (76) 80.6% 77.6% No (19) (22) 19.4% 22.4% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Never (15) (16) 15.3% 16.3% Only Once (6) (10) 6.1% 10.2% One or More Times Per Week (22) (13) 22.4% 13.3% Every 2-3 Weeks (8) (5) 8.2% 5.1% Every 2-5 Months (2) (11) 2.0% 11.2% Every 6 Months or Longer (14) (18) 14.3% 18.4% Many Times (4) (3) 4.1% 3.1% Summer Only (9) (10) 9.2% 10.2% No Estimate Given (18) (11) 18.4% 11.2% Only When Foot Patrol Responds to Call (0) (1) 0.0% 1.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0 100.0
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Description or Name Given (55) (51) 56.1% 52.0% No Description/No Name (43) (47) 43.9% 48.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 More (11) (13) 11.2% 13.3% Less (59) (64) 60.2% 65.3% Average (9) (12) 9.2% 12.2% Do Not Know (19) (9) 19.4% 9.2% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1985 B&E/Burglary (62) 63.3% Robbery (9) 9.2% Property Damage (7) 7.1% Personal Injury (8) 8.2% Juvenile Problems (5) 5.1% Gun Related (2) 2.0% Drug Related (1) 1.0% Not Applicable (0) 0.0% Asked But Not Specified (4) 4.1% Totals (98) 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (13) (9) 13.3% 9.2% No (85) (87) 86.7% 88.8% Do Not Know (0) (2) 0.0% 2.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (59) (48) 60.2% 49.0% No (11) (17) 11.2% 17.3% Do Not Know (25) (33) 25.5% 33.7% No Opinion (3) (0) 3.1% 0.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (70) (64) 71.4% 65.3% No (5) (9) 5.1% 9.2% Do Not Know (20) (24) 20.4% 24.5% Some Did/Some Did Not (0) (1) 0.0% 1.0% No Opinion Given (3) (0) 3.1% 0.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (35) 38 35.7% 38.8% No (59) (59) 60.2% 60.2% No Answer (4) (1) 4.1% 1.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (46) (44) 46.9% 44.9% No (52) (54) 53.1% 55.1% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Favorable (43) (28) 43.9% 28.6% Not Favorable (3) (11) 3.1% 11.2% Do Not Know (51) (56) 52.0% 57.1% Mixed: Favorable/Unfavorable (1) (3) 1.0% 3.1% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (32) (31) 32.7% 31.6% No (66) (67) 67.3% 68.4% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (67) (50) 68.4% 51.0% No (4) (18) 4.0% 18.4% Do Not Know (27) (30) 27.6% 30.6% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Suggestions (66) (56) 67.3% 57.1% No Suggestions (32) (42) 32.7% 42.9% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (72) (55) 73.5% 56.1% No (20) (38) 20.4% 38.8% No Definitive Answers (6) (5) 6.1% 5.1% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Foot Patrol Officers (59) (46) 60.2% 46.9% Motor Patrol Officers (24) (32) 24.5% 32.7% Both (6) (8) 6.1% 8.2% Neither (1) (1) 1.0% 1.0% Do Not Know (3) (9) 3.1% 9.2% No Answer (5) (2) 5.1% 2.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Foot Patrol Officers (78) (61) 79.6% 62.2% Motor Patrol Officers (7) (10) 7.1% 10.2% Both (4) (3) 4.1% 3.1% Neither (0) (2) 0.0% 2.0% Do Not Know (5) (22) 5.1% 22.5% No Answer (4) (0) 4.1% 0.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Foot Patrol Officers (32) (27) 32.6% 27.6% Motor Patrol Officers (53) (49) 54.1% 50.0% Both (4) (6) 4.1% 6.1% Neither (0) (2) 0.0% 2.0% Do Not Know (4) (14) 4.1% 14.3% No Answer (5) (0) 5.1% 0.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Foot Patrol Officers (38) (27) 38.8% 27.6% Motor Patrol Officers (35) (32) 35.7% 32.7% Both (13) (15) 13.3% 15.3% Neither (0) (2) 0.0% 2.0% Do Not Know (8) (22) 8.2% 22.4% No Answer (4) (0) 4.0% 0.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Foot Patrol Officers (82) (65) 83.7% 66.3% Motor Patrol Officers (7) (5) 7.1% 5.1% Both (3) (6) 3.1% 6.1% Neither (0) (2) 0.0% 2.1% Do Not Know (1) (18) 1.0% 18.3% No Answer (5) (2) 5.1% 2.1% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Foot Patrol Officers (56) (36) 57.1% 36.7% Motor Patrol Officers (14) (22) 14.3% 22.5% Both (14) (14) 14.3 14.3% Neither (0) (4) 0.0% 4.1% Do Not Know (9) (21) 9.2% 21.4% No Answer (5) (1) 5.1% 1.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Yes (25) (32) 25.5% 32.7 No (73) (66) 74.5% 67.3% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1985 Program Less Effective Now (49) 50.0% Program More Effective Now (6) 6.1% Perceive No Change Since 1981 (30) 30.6% Do Not Know If Changes Occurred (13) 13.3% Totals (98) 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1985 Yes (21) 21.4% No (77) 78.6% Totals (98) 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1985 Yes (87)* 88.8% No (11) 11.2% Totals (98) 100.0%
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(Count) Col. % 1981 1985 Specific Expectations (89) (96) 90.8% 98.0 Did Not Specify Expectations (9) (2) 9.2% 2.0% Totals (98) (98) 100.0% 100.0%
ENDNOTES
National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center
Publications
Books
An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol
Program in Flint, Michigan
A Manual for the Establishment and Operation
of a Foot Patrol Program
Articles
Perceptions of Safety: A Comparison of Foot Patrol
Versus Motor Patrol Officers
Job Satisfaction: A Comparison of Foot Patrol
Versus Motor Patrol Officers
The Status of Contemporary Community Policing
Programs
The Impact of Foot Patrol on Black and White
Perceptions of Policing
Uniform Crime Reporting and Community Policing:
An Historical Perspective
Performance Profiles of Foot Versus Motor Officers
The Foot Patrol Officers, the Community, and
the School: A Coalition Against Crime
Community Policing: Defining the Officer's Role
Foot Patrol: Some Problem Areas
An Evaluation of a Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program
If you wish to receive a copy of a Center publication, please contact us at the address or telephone numbers given below.
National Center for Community Policing
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University
560 Baker Hall
East Lansing, Michigan 48824-1118
800-892-9051 or (517) 355-9648
or visit our website @ http://www.ssc.msu.edu/~cj