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SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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**DETROIT CEASEFIRE
INDIVIDUAL RE-OFFENDING ANALYSES
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT**

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Summary: In the evaluation report of Detroit Ceasefire¹, the research team summarized the key finding that Ceasefire was associated with reductions in fatal and non-fatal shootings in the precincts where it had been implemented. The analysis of the impact on individuals participating in Ceasefire was promising in terms of the number of repeat incidents but the overall differences in re-arrest between Ceasefire clients and similar probationers and parolees were limited. The challenge in that analysis, however, was that Ceasefire clients are purposively selected based on their involvement in gangs and violent street groups and consequently they represent a high risk group of probationers and parolees.

In an effort to address this limitation, the research team worked with the Detroit Police Department's (DPD) Gang Intelligence Unit to develop a more comparable comparison group. Specifically, the probationer and parolee comparison group that was previously matched based on characteristics including gender, race, and number of prior arrests, was also matched based on gang affiliation. This produced a comparison group more equivalent to the Ceasefire clients than in the original analysis.

The research team then conducted an analysis of re-offending comparing participants in Ceasefire with probationers and parolees with similar demographic, prior offense, and gang affiliation characteristics.

Findings:

This analysis focused on individuals participating in Detroit Ceasefire call-in meetings between August 2013 and December 2016. The advantage of focusing on these clients is that it allows a three-year follow-up period. There were 14 call-in meetings during this period involving 257 clients who attended a meeting. As Table 1 indicates, the clients averaged between five and six prior arrests. The comparison group consisted of 337 probationers and parolees with very similar demographic and arrest histories. Additionally, these were probationers and parolees with gang affiliations.

Table 2 reports on the number of initial re-arrests. That is, the number of individuals with a re-arrest at one year, two years, and three years. After three years, 59 percent of the comparison group had a re-arrest for any offense compared to 51 percent for Ceasefire clients. Similarly, after three years, 18 percent of the comparison group had been re-arrested for a violent offense compared to 15 percent of Ceasefire clients. For weapons offense arrests, 12 percent of the comparison group had been re-arrested compared to 9 percent of Ceasefire clients. As displayed in Figure 1, an interesting pattern emerges whereby Ceasefire clients initially had more arrests for weapons offenses but this declined significantly over the full three-year period. This likely reflects Ceasefire "pulling levers" enforcement action. Following a call-in, if there was continued violence involving gangs and groups warned at a call-in meeting, there would be proactive Ceasefire enforcement. This included Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)-DPD compliance home visits, warrant service, directed patrols and similar activities. It seems likely this resulted in greater likelihood of arrest for Ceasefire clients in the period following a

¹ Circo, McGarrell, Krupa & De Biasi, *Detroit Ceasefire: Final Evaluation Report*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. https://cj.msu.edu/assets/MJSC-Detroit_Ceasefire_Final_Report.pdf

